In the past decade, Real Time Bidding (RTB) has become one of the most common purchase mechanisms of the online advertisement market. Under RTB a unique second-price auction between bidders is managed for every individual advertisement slot. We consider the bidder's problem of maximizing the value of the bundle of ads they purchase, subject to budget constraints, and assuming the value of each ad is known. We generalize the problem as a second-price knapsack problem with uncertain resource consumption: the bidder wins an auction when they bid the highest amount, but they pay an amount equal to the second-highest bid, unknown a priori. Surprisingly, because of the second-price mechanism, we prove that a linear form of bidding yields a near-optimal selection of ads. We extend to an implementable online one-shot learning algorithm. We prove that key points of the random permutation assumption hold in this setting, and that we can apply algorithms for the online-knapsack problem to this setting. Through this we recover a competitive ratio of 1−6 , where is the training ratio and is small in general, yielding a strong theoretical result on an important variation of the standard online knapsack problem. Numerical results from the iPinYou dataset verify our results, recovering a bundle of ads with 99.5% -100.0% of the optimal value.
Introduction
Online advertising is one of the fastest growing sectors in the Information Technology (IT) industry. Total digital ad spending in the U.S. increased by 16% year-over-year in 2016 to $83 billion, and the global digital advertising market is projected to reach a total of $330 billion by 2020.
1 Recently, the increasing volume of impressions and ads led to the birth of ad exchanges. This resulted in a larger market where advertisers have a stronger chance of locating a preferential ad-context and publishers generate more revenue by being matched with these advertisers.
These ad exchanges allocate ads based on a variety of auction mechanisms. One popular auction framework taking advantage of this is real-time bidding (RTB): an auction for each ad slot is triggered when a user visits a web-page, with the auction containing specific contextual parameters; the ad exchange then solicits bid requests from several Demand Side Platforms (DSPs), who each can return a bid for an advertiser it represents; finally the winning ad reaches the publisher. The paying price is set according to a second-price auction mechanism, i.e. the winner is the bidder with the highest bid, provided that it is above the floor price set by the exchange, and the winner pays a maximum of the floor price and the second highest bid. Given that all steps in the auction mechanism must be completed before the web-page loads, each step must be computed quickly. Notably the bid price calculated and submitted by a DSP must be done within a time-frame of about 10 milliseconds. Furthermore, DSPs may receive a large number of bid requests from exchanges per second, while billions of people explore the web around the globe. Hence, a DSP's job can be quite intensive, and there is a limit to the number of updates that can be made to the bidding strategy in an online setting. We represent the process of online advertising, bidding and ad allocation in Figure 1.
Our Contribution
We consider the problem from the perspective of a bidder (DSP) who represents a single advertiser. The bidder wants to maximize the total value of the ads, indexed by i ∈ I, they purchase, subject to a total budget constraint, where the value of each ad v i is known to the bidder using contextual parameters (user and ad slot information). The bidder must create a bidding policy where they bid π i based on the information available to them at the time: the value of the ad v i , and their remaining budget. Unlike a traditional knapsack problem, there are two significant difficulties when finding an optimal bidding policy. First, we do not know whether we will win an auction based on the amount that we bid, since the paying price b i is not determined before completion of the auction. Second, even if we win the auction, we do not know beforehand the amount that we pay; we only know that it will be less than the amount we bid. We generalize this framework to a second-price knapsack problem with uncertain budget consumption in (K-2).
We first consider the retrospective offline setting, in which the paying prices b i are known. Considering this as a selection problem rather than a bidding problem, it reduces to a traditional knapsack problem. From the offline greedy knapsack algorithm, a threshold policy on the valueto-price ratio vi bi is optimal for the linear relaxation of this selection problem which is a known result. That is, we select all ads where vi bi > λ * , and some fraction where vi bi = λ * , where λ * ∈ R is an optimal solution to the dual problem. Furthermore, in our specific context, where total budget is large relative to individual ad prices, the greedy approach yields a near-optimal solution to the integer selection problem as well.
The question is whether this can be turned into an implementable bidding strategy in the online second-price knapsack setting, where the information b i is not available at the time of bidding. Surprisingly, because of the second-price auction mechanism, we show that we can recover exactly this near-optimal selection with a linear form of bidding only based on the value of the ad.
Furthermore, we look at the problem of training the linear bid-parameter λ * in this online setting with known time horizon. We show that under mild assumptions (stable arrivals of bid requests, and stable setting week-to-week) we can recover the key pieces of the randompermutation assumption that online-knapsack algorithms rely on. We then show that again using the structure of a second-price auction, we can implement certain results from the general online knapsack problem to this second-price knapsack problem with uncertain budget consumption. Doing so we show that we can implement an online form of linear-bidding very close to what we proved in the offline setting, that has a competitive ratio of 1 − 6 , and where the real-life context allows to be small. This yields a strong theoretical result on an important variation of the standard online knapsack problem which arises in the context of Internet advertisement. Here instead of each item having a known price and value, the item is sold through a second-price auction, having an unknown paying price to the bidder that their bid must exceed in order to win. We thus refer to this problem as the second-price knapsack problem.
Finally we use the iPinYou dataset to give numerical support to our work. iPinYou is currently the largest DSP in China. The dataset contains logs of features, bids, assignments, feedback for all impressions over a season. We processed the contextual information for every impression, scored the market price and customer feedback (click). From reviewing the data, the different features clearly affected the value of an impression which also changed based on the advertiser. We fit a model for each advertiser to estimate the value of an ad based on the contextual features. We evaluate the performance of our bidding strategy in the online setting and compare it to the offline optimum value for different advertisers and budgets. We are able to recover ad bundles with 99.5% to 100.0% of the value of the optimal bundle. These results demonstrate the practical implications and effectiveness of our work.
Related Work
Knapsack problems and the design and analysis of online algorithms have been widely studied in operations research, while the specific RTB context has been studied more within the computer science community.
Our bidding policies are based on a theoretical analysis of the knapsack problem, and its variant the packing problem. In fact we cast the optimal bidding policy as the solution to a knapsack problem with budget uncertainty, as stated in (K-2). We refer the interested reader to Kellerer et al. [2004] for a thorough review of knapsack problems. As for the online knapsack problem, Marchetti-Spaccamela and Vercellis [1995] prove that the competitive ratio can be pushed away from near-optimality to 1 − 1 e in the adversarial knapsack problem, even for randomized algorithms. Lueker [1998] designs a value-to-bid threshold function which depends on the ratio budget spent over leftover time to design a binary decision function. They then provide a scheme for approximating the optimal thresholding function from observed realizations. The fractional knapsack problem has been studied in Noga and Sarbua [2005] . In our work we use packing duality theory, through which we are able to derive the desired optimality guarantees.
In order to avoid the adversarial setup of the online problem, recent literature considered variations of the stochastic setting. Kleywegt and Papastavrou [1998] analyze the stochastic case where items are drawn from an i.i.d. distribution. Under this framework, extensive research has been done for the bandits with knapsacks problem. Further under the random permutation model, Devanur and Hayes [2009] prove a competitive ratio for their algorithm, which is based on a linear program (LP). Their approach solves offline the LP associated to a sample of the items, which is large enough to recover the distribution and thus provide concentration inequalities. These then provide guarantees on the dual variables from the sub-sampled LP to the true LP. Integer optimization tools then bridge the gap to recover the true solution. Agrawal et al. [2014] ; Feldman et al. [2010] use similar ideas, but using a dynamic algorithm solving multiple LPs in online fashion. This approach yields tighter bounds given the sharper estimate of the dual parameters from the data. In their work, they focus on providing a competitive ratio analysis for when the input size is large.
On the other hand, Buchbinder et al. [2009] provide a wide variety of algorithms for more general online optimization problems. They approach these by using Primal-Dual algorithms which yield arbitrarily good competitiveness ratios while violating dual constraints by some factor. These compare however to thresholding functions by setting dual prices for budget consumptions. Babaioff et al. [2008] analyze the special case of the secretary problem where weights are in {0, 1}. Buchbinder and Naor [2005, 2006] give an algorithm with a multiplicative competitive ratio of O(log(U/L)) for the online knapsack problem based on a general online primal-dual framework where U, L are respectively constraining upper and lower bounds on the individual value of ads. We compare our design of an online Primal-Dual algorithm to their work. Unfortunately we pay the price of violating a constraint to trade-off a competitive ratio. We suggest further work can be done there.
Further work has been in done in the multi-bidder setting. Balseiro and Gur [2017] model the evolution of market-price by considering the behavior of other bidders. Each bidder has a valuation unknown to others, and the benefit is given by the difference of the paying price and value. They cast the bidders' offline oracle strategy as a knapsack problem as well. They prove the existence of a "sub-optimality" constant of the online algorithm compared to the offline oracle, and establish convergence to an equilibrium in dynamic strategies. In our setting we consider that the value from the ad is not influenced by bidders' budget. We provide a novel strong near-optimality guarantee of our bidding strategy, by considering a stable system. We now relate the knapsack problems to the RTB literature. The design of a bidding strategy requires an algorithm to cast real-time decisions for the bidder based on contextual information. Recent contributions have been made to the bidding strategies by formulating the problem as an online knapsack problem. Notably in the advertisement community, Chakrabarty et al. [2007] design the problem by assuming bounds on items' values, which are small compared to the total budget. Similarly to Lueker [1998] , they design an online algorithm based on a threshold function guiding their bidding strategy. Their algorithms depend on some input parameters which directly influences its performance. We extend their work by proving near-optimality of a threshold based algorithm under some large-scale assumptions. The idea of using a threshold function was first introduced by Williamson [1992] , however they design an asymptotically optimal strategy only when the arrival distribution is known.
We finally provide an overview of the RTB literature which often make very stylized and stringent assumptions to provide tractability. These may be assumptions on the distribution of the arrivals or assuming that the probability of winning an auction is a direct function of the amount bid. Keyword auctions have been studied while others deal with more empirical and data driven questions [see Chen et al., 2011; Edelman and Ostrovsky, 2007; Lee et al., 2012 Lee et al., , 2013 Ren et al., 2018; Yuan et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2014; .
We do not review the broader ad allocation and planing problems which can be combined to our work on bidding strategies.
Model and Analysis
We take the bidder position of a DSP representing a single advertiser. When we are presented with an auction for a new ad slot, we must decide whether to bid on the ad or not, and if so, how much to bid. We consider the set of all feasible, non-anticipatory, bidding policies Π, which satisfy our budget constraint, where for any π ∈ Π and ad i we bid some amount π i ≥ 0. We win the auction when π i is the highest bid among our competitors and above the floor price defined for the auction, and we pay the maximum of the other bids and the floor price. We label this paying price b i , and note that we win the auction whenever π i ≥ b i and always pay amount b i when we win.
Our main difficulty in designing a bidding strategy for the online setting is that we do not know the paying price b i a priori. We first consider the offline traditional knapsack problem in which b i is known. We then show there exists a bidding policy π for the online second-price auction setting where b i is unknown which is a linear function only of the value of the ads v i and some bid parameter λ * , and recovers a near-optimal selection. We then consider the problem of training the bid parameter λ * for our second-price knapsack strategy, in an online setting. We again relate to work on selection policies for the online traditional knapsack problem, and show that work by [Agrawal et al., 2014] for an online oneshot-learning algorithm with a competitive ratio of 1 − 6 can be applied, provided that paying prices b i are known a priori. Then, for the online second-price knapsack problem where the paying prices b i are unknown, we show how this selection policy can be modified to let us learn a bidding policy, and derive a one-shot-learning algorithm to train the bid parameter λ * guiding our linear bid, and achieve the same competitive ratio of 1 − 6 .
Model Framework
We consider the model with respect to any feasible bidding policy π ∈ Π satisfying the budget constraint, where we bid π i for ad i. Although the paying price b i is unknown, we win if π i ≥ b i , and pay amount b i . This allows us to cast the second-price knapsack problem with budget uncertainty, hence labeled K-2, for the online setting as:
In the setting where the paying price b i is known at the time of bidding, then the problem reduces to a traditional knapsack problem. Items arrive with known value v i and paying price b i . If we want to select this item we just bid some amount π i at least as large as b i and pay b i . If we do not want to select the item we just bid π i = 0. We rewrite the problem by replacing our policy π with equivalent selection variables x i ∈ {0, 1} and have:
Near Optimality of the Linear Bid
In this section we present our first result: an implementable bidding policy π to recover a near optimal selection of ads for the offline setting, using only the information that was available when ads were presented and bids were solicited.
Theorem 1. For any set of ads {i ∈ I} with values v i ≤ v max , we consider the problem of creating a bidding policy to maximize total value subject to our budget B, as stated in (K-2). Then there exists some constant λ * ∈ R + such that the linear bidding policy π which bids an amount π i = v i λ * yields a feasible selection of ads with a total value within v max of the optimal value.
In the rest of the section we provide the proof of the theorem. We begin by assuming that the paying prices b i are known, in which case we can reformulate (K-2) as the traditional knapsack problem (K). We then view the existence of dual prices that allow us to solve the linear relaxation of the traditional knapsack problem exactly: we select an item if and only if vi bi is above a certain parameter λ * [see Bertsekas, 1995; Fisher, 1981; Kellerer et al., 2004 ]. We then demonstrate that the optimality gap between the linear relaxation of (K) and the integer formulation is bounded by a small amount because of the specific RTB context. Next, we turn offline selection into an implementable online bidding policy for (K-2), and in turn prove near-optimality for this policy.
Let us again write our budgeted traditional knapsack problem as in (K). We will then relax the integer constraints so that the bidder can purchase a fraction of an auction. More specifically, let v i denote the value and b i the paying price of advertisement {i ∈ I}, and let B denote the total budget. The knapsack problem (IP) and its linear programming relaxation (LP) can then be written as:
The dual problem to (LP) is:
where we assume impressions are sorted so that the ratios vi bi are in descending order, i.e.
. The impressions are therefore ranked. Assume for simplicity that i b i ≥ B. As we are trying to minimize a convex piecewise linear function, the optimal value λ * is interpretable as the value-price ratio threshold λ = v b above which we will select an ad. Denoting by a superscript * the optimal values, we provide the following known lemma from the linear relaxation (LP), similar to Fisher [1981] .
Lemma 1. Consider the offline knapsack problem (IP) and its linear programming relaxation (LP). Let v i denote the value and b i the paying price of advertisement {i ∈ I}. There exists some constant λ * such that we can recover an optimal solution to formulation (LP) using a fractional selection policy x * such that
Proof. Proof. The proof relies on the complementary slackness conditions. Let x * denote the optimal solution to the (LP), and let λ * and z * the optimal solution to its dual formulation (Dual), these exist by evident strong duality. The following complementary slackness condition entails the described selection policy:
, it follows that z * i > 0 from the feasibility conditions for (4). From the second complementary slackness condition we have x * i = 1 so we fully purchase the ad.
If
vi bi < λ * . From the structure of (4) we see that we minimize each choice of z
From the first complementary slackness condition it follows that x * i = 0 i.e. we do not purchase the ad.
Otherwise
vi bi = λ * , we purchase some fraction, spending down the remaining budget.
If we make the additional assumption that the ratios vi bi are unique for our selection of ads I, then we can additionally say that there exists threshold λ * such that we maximize total value i x i × v i subject to our budget constraints by purchasing all ads where vi bi > λ * , a fraction of the one ad where vi bi = λ * , and no ads where vi bi < λ * . We will use this assumption in the next section. This proved to be a reasonable assumption based on our numerical analysis of the values associated with predicted click-through rates and paying prices for the iPinYou dataset as discussed in Section 3.
Near-optimality of the linear selection for the integer knapsack problem in the setting where budget is large, and ad paying prices and values are small, is also an intuitive and straightforward result. Let us consider the formulations (IP) and (LP), let us denote the offline duality threshold as λ * and the optimal solution to (LP) as x * . From Lemma 1, for the ads where vi bi > λ * we have x * i = 1, and for the ads where vi bi < λ * we have x * i = 0. Finally by our uniqueness assumption on vi bi , we have a single ad indexed by j with x j = 0 and x i = 0, ∀i > j. Define the functions Z LP (B) and Z IP (B) as the optimal objective values for (LP) and (IP) with budget B. We derive the following lemma which guarantees the near-optimality of our bid strategy:
Lemma 2. Let x * be the optimal solution of (LP) with budget B, described in Lemma 1, where j refers to the unique ad we purchase with x j > 0 and x i = 0, ∀i > j. We get the following bound on the optimal selection strategy with budget B:
Proof. Proof. We notice that when our budget is B + b j (1 − x * j ) rather than B for (LP), then the optimal solution from Lemma 1 is an integer solution, and thus also optimal for the corresponding integer program. We find a similar result for a budget of B − b j x * j as well. Combining these results we have:
Then, since feasibility of a solution x stays ensured when provided with a larger budget, we get the inequalities:
We then simplify this inequality to the Lemma's result.
We interpret Lemma 2 as follows: if we adopt a slightly modified dual threshold strategy where we buy all ads with λ * > vj bj and no ads with λ * ≤ vj bj , then we end up with a feasible set of ads that is within v j of the optimal value to the integer programming formulation (IP). When we combine this with an assumption that the value of each ad is small relative to the total value of the optimal bundle, we can say that we are near-optimal.
Assumption 1 (Low-Individual-Impact). For each ad, the value of each ad is negligible compared to the total value attained.
This "Low-Individual-Impact" assumption entails that b j B and v j Z IP (B). Let us point out that when our budget becomes large, the slightly modified dual threshold strategy gives us a selection of ads with value arbitrarily close relative to the integer optimal value. As such we describe this strategy as near-optimal.
Note that so far our results, conditioned on us knowing the paying-price (cost) of an ad, are essentially results for the offline knapsack algorithm with some context-specific attributes guaranteeing near-optimality. In practice though, real-time bidding for Internet ads is fundamentally different as we do not know the paying price of an ad prior to bidding, and even if we win, the paying price will not be equal to what we bid. The question remains of how we take a near-optimal selection policy and turn it into a near-optimal bidding policy when paying prices aren't known.
The following lemma bridges that gap. It shows that because of the second price auction properties we can create an implementable online linear bidding strategy for (K-2), recovered from the dual of the linear relaxation of the selection problem (K), where we recover exactly the ads where * . Therefore because of the second price auction format we find that a linear form of bidding wins the exact set of ads as the dual threshold strategy, and pays the same price.
Combining this with the section on near-optimality of the dual threshold strategy, we arrive at the first main result of our work, in the Theorem 1. We now provide the formal proof.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 1. Consider the (IP) and (LP) formulations from section 2.2 and the subsequent notations. With lemma 2, we know that the total value we can obtain from Z IP (B) is bounded by the value of the linear relaxation with corrected budget and value, i.e. by
Using lemma 3, we could recover the same set of ads as in the linear relaxation by using a scaled linear bid with parameter 1 λ * for the online problem (K-2). Therefore by using this strategy, we are within max i (v i ) of the optimal bidding strategy with budget B, i.e. the value Z IP (B). This concludes the proof.
Most importantly Theorem 1 holds for any set of ads. This means that even in the online setting, for any fixed budget B and fixed time horizon T , the linear form of bidding with bid vi λ * for ad i will be near optimal on the upcoming set of ads. The difficulty comes in finding the parameter λ * to use. In the next section we will explore how to find a near-optimal value of λ * in the online setting.
Competitive Ratios in the Online Setting
In this section we present our second result (Corollary 1.0.1): a one-shot learning algorithm, under simple assumptions, that creates an online, near-optimal bidding policy. We say that a deterministic algorithm has competitive ratio α for the online problem if:
where OP T (I) denotes the performance obtained by the offline optimum on a random instance I, ALG(I) is the performance of the online algorithm, and the expectation is taken over the randomness in online instances.
We assume a stable setting, where our competitors have consistent bidding strategies, and ad arrival rates are the same week-to-week. We also make assumptions on the arrivals of ads, which are reasonable for the specific context of real-time bidding. From these assumptions we recover what we call the random sample property on an expanded set of ads, that includes some synthetic zero-value ads. This property states that the first w of our w weeks will contain a random sample of a fraction of the ads in the expanded ad set. From the random sample assumption, we apply existing work on one-shot learning for the online knapsack by Agrawal et al. [2014] . Using this, we show a selection policy on the evaluation period that is always feasible, and has a competitive ratio of 1 − 6 . Finally we show how this selection policy can be turned into a bidding policy, only with knowledge of v i for the testing period, similar to Theorem 1. Corollary 1.0.1. Let there be w ∈ N weeks of ads, where ads are indexed by i ∈ I with |I| = n. Consider the stable setting from Assumptions 2 and 3. Let B denote total budget and let b max be an upper bound on the paying price for any ad. Select a training ratio ∈ (0, 1) s.t. w ∈ N, and satisfies the budget constraint
For the first w weeks of ads, determine the optimal dual price solution λ * to (OLA-LP), and then apply a bidding policy of π i = min{ vi λ * , B } for ads i in our evaluation period, where B is our remaining budget. Then the bidding policy π is always feasible, and has a competitive ratio of 1 − 6 relative to the optimal bidding policy over the entire set of ads I.
In the rest of the section, we provide the proof of Corollary 1.0.1. Our work relies on two assumptions regarding the arrival of ads and stability of the auction over time:
Assumption 2. Conditioned on n ads arriving in w weeks, each ad arrives in any week with probability 1 w , and these distributions of arrival for different ads are independent of each other. Assumption 3. Competitors have consistent bidding strategies week-to-week. That is, given ad i with value v i and specific contextual parameters, the competitors bid the same amount for the ad regardless of which week it arrives in. As a result, paying price b i is the same for us if we win the ad, regardless of which week the ad arrives in.
In order to apply our one-shot learning algorithm, we need to rely on Assumptions 2 and 3. We denote w the number of advertisement weeks in our campaign, and n the total number of ads. We then split our total ad set of ads i ∈ I into a partition for training and evaluation. We denote I Train representing the first w weeks and I Eval representing the last (1 − )w weeks. We consider that at the end of the first w weeks we know the paying price for all ads i ∈ I Train , which we need to train our algorithm for the evaluation period. In practice we might only have a censored sample of this information (where the paying price must have been at least as high as our bid for ads we did not win). Letting n the number of ads, we consider n(1 − )/ synthetic zero-value ads added to our pool. We attach these zero-value ads in such a way that the first weeks have exactly n total ads (including synthetic zero-value).
Under Assumption 2, we are equally likely to recover each fraction of the ads (including synthetic ones) in I Train . This directly implies the following lemma.
Lemma 4 (Random Sample). Under Assumption 2, when we train on the first fraction of the weeks, we are equally likely to train our model on each fraction of the expanded set of ads (including synthetic). We then evaluate on the remainder, which yields the random sample assumption.
Proof. Proof. From Assumption 2, the non-zero ads are first distributed within the w weeks. This implies that I Train is equally likely to be any sample of ads. We then fill in the set of ads such that the training period has exactly n ads (including synthetic), and the evaluation has n(1 − )/ . After artificially adding in these zero-value impressions, we have a total of n/ ads. Among these, the first w weeks will contain n ads for training, as if they were drawn without replacement from the total n/ ads. Therefore under these assumptions we have recovered the random sample assumption, where we are training our algorithm on the first w weeks on a randomly drawn fraction of the ads. Given that the considered filling method is invariant to any permutation of our data, then we are able to recover the random sample assumption. Since we characterize ads not only by their value and contextual parameters, but also by their paying price, we also use Assumption 3 to guarantee that the paying prices are unaffected by the ordering of the ads.
This lemma provides the same necessary properties as the random permutation assumption for the proof of Proposition 1 of Agrawal et al. [2014] . The random permutation assumption states that conditioned on n ads arriving in a time frame, each permutation of arrivals was equally likely to occur. However its only use [in Agrawal et al., 2014, Proposition 1] is to show that we are equally likely to train on any fraction of the ads, which is provided by the random sample assumption as well.
In fact we refute the use of the more stringent random permutation assumption in the RTB setting. In fact, if n ads showed up in w weeks, the training and evaluation sets would not be guaranteed to consist of entire weeks. Since the distribution of arrivals changes throughout the week, it is also not reasonable to assume that order in which the ads arrived would have been a random permutation. Furthermore the random permutation assumption is inconsistent with the magnitude of the weekly seasonality effects observed on the iPinYou dataset and discussed in the empirical work in Section 3. Now that we have shown the random sample assumption holds for the first w weeks, we can apply existing work on one-shot learning for the online knapsack selection algorithm by Agrawal et al. [2014] . We show a selection policy on the evaluation period that is feasible with probability 1 − , and has a competitive ratio of 1 − 6 . Consider the following problem on the training period of the first w weeks, with a budget of (1 − ) B:
Given we know the paying prices b i for i ∈ I Train from the training period, we can solve (OLA-IP) as we solved (IP) in the previous section. We again consider the linear relaxation as given in (OLA-LP), and solve the dual as we did in the previous section in Lemma 1. Doing so we know there is a constant λ * ∈ R + such that selecting ads where vi bi ≥ λ * recovers a selection of bids which is near optimal. Selecting ads in the evaluation period meeting this same criteria will give us near optimal selection of ads, as given by Proposition 1 of Agrawal et al. [2014] and described in the Lemma below:
Lemma 5. Let there be w ∈ N weeks of ads, where our expanded set of ads (including synthetic zero-value) are indexed by i ∈ I with |I| = m = n/ . Consider the stable setting from Assumptions 2 and 3. Let B denote total budget and let b max be an upper bound on the paying price for any ad. Select a training ratio ∈ (0, 1) s.t. w ∈ N, and satisfies the budget constraint:
For the first w weeks of ads, determine the optimal dual price solution λ * to (OLA-LP). For the evaluation period of the last (1 − )w weeks, we select all ads where x i = 1 if vi bi ≥ λ * and b i ≤ B , and x i = 0 otherwise, where B is our remaining budget. Then our selection policy is feasible and has a competitive ratio of 1 − 6 relative to the optimal bidding policy over the entire set of ads I.
Proof. Proof. From Lemma 4, by training on w weeks we also train on a random sample of of the expanded set of ads. Other than that change, this Lemma is stated in a generalized context as Proposition 1 in Agrawal et al. [2014] , and a detailed proof is included in their work.
Finally we again show how we can turn this selection policy into an implementable bidding policy, and complete the proof for Corollary 1.0.1.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 1.0.1. From Assumptions 2 and 3 we recover the needed pieces from the random permutation assumption as shown in Lemma 4. Using our knowledge from the training period we prove Lemma 5, which gives us a near-optimal selection policy when we know b i . This Algorithm 1 One-Shot Learning Algorithm 1: procedure Near-Optimal Bidding Strategy( , w) t denotes time. w ∈ N.
2:
while t < w do
3:
Record ad value and paying price. Continue.
4:
Determine optimal dual parameters λ * on impressions in first w weeks, as in Lemma 1.
5:
6:
For impression i, bid min{ vi λ * , B } where B is the left-over budget
7:
If the auction is won, collect value and update budget selection policy is to set x i = 1 if vi bi ≥ λ * and b i ≤ B and x i = 0 otherwise, where λ * is the optimal dual price solution for (OLA-LP) and B is our remaining budget.
The only remaining question is how to turn this into an implementable bidding strategy when b i is unknown at the time of the auction. Since v i is known we can apply similar reasoning as in Lemma 3. We consider the bidding policy where π i = min{ Contextually, since our budget is very large relative to ad prices, this process could be applied for a very small , and would give a very strong competitive bound. Since (OLA-IP) also resembles (K) when is small, Corollary 1.0.1 also gives support to the idea that in the stable setting we can directly learn the optimal bidding strategy from historical data, as in Theorem 1, with good results in the online setting as well. For clarity we now present our One-Shot Learning Algorithm in Algorithm 1 as pseudo-code. Under the assumptions of Lemma 5, we collect a near-optimal set of ads.
Relaxing the stable setting assumption: While we have shown existence of a near-optimal linear form of bidding for any selection of ads that will appear in the online problem, we haven't explored how to maintain a good estimate of λ * for the online problem in a non-stable setting. In the non-stable setting there are many factors that might affect the optimal value of lambda, such as changes in arrival rates for different types of individuals, changes in competitors' bidding strategies, changes in budget, and changes the value of some impressions. Care must be taken to maintain reasonable estimates of λ * for the non-stable setting. In practice there are heuristic fixes that would help today, including constantly updating the best guesses for impression value given historical data, and to retrain λ * based on the changes in incoming arrival patterns. Perhaps with more data, over a longer setting, we might be able to get a sense for how the incoming ads might change over time. Using this we could start approaching the problem of maintaining a good competitive ratio in a random or adversarial online setting given a distribution of long-term trends that might happen to the arrival rates or ad values.
Empirical Results
In this section we use the iPinYou dataset to give numerical support to our work. We estimated the click-through rate per advertiser from the contextual features for every impression, and we set it as the value of an impression for a given advertiser. We then measure the efficiency of our algorithm described in th previous section and show we are able to recover ad bundles with 99.5% to 100.0% of the value of the optimal bundle, with hindsight. These results are robust to Outcome of the ad -whether the user clicked or purchased. Bidding price The value bid by the advertiser. Paying price The value paid by the winner of the auction, equal to the second highest bid. Advertiser ID Information concerning the advertiser. changes in budget, and are consistent for all advertisers, which highlights the effectiveness of our methods.
iPinYou Dataset
Until recently, academics were limited in studying the application of RTB strategies since bidding data is generally kept secretive. Fortunately in 2013, iPinYou Information Technologies Co., Ltd (iPinYou), which is currently the largest DSP in China, began a competition for RTB algorithms and released three seasons of data for a small number of advertisers. Each season corresponds to one week of data, with the entire release totaling 35GB. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first publicly available RTB dataset.
Data Format For the competition, iPinYou released information for different types of exchange activity: bids, impressions, clicks, and conversions. Combined, these datasets capture most of the relevant data from an auction: 1) The contextual ad features which are sent along with bid requests (ad slot parameters, viewer demographics), 2) The winning bid amount and the paying price (which we refer to as the market price), and 3) The user feedback, i.e. clicks and conversions on the won impression. The dataset variables and advertisers also vary by season, so we chose to focus our numerical testing on season three of the data, which included advertiser and user IDs.
The summarized features for the data and a full description are provided in Tables 1 & 2 . This brief review of the iPinYou dataset suggests there exist opportunities for more efficient bidding strategies among each advertiser. In addition we also report the basic statistics from the third season of data (June 6-12) in Table 3 . 
Data Pre-Processing
Starting with the iPinYou data shown in Table 1 , processing was performed to get the data in a usable format. We first deleted the small number of ad impressions for which there was missing data and then deduplicated to remove a small number of redundant rows. We then extracted the weekday and hour feature from timestamps. From user agent text, we extracted operating systems. We also split the column of the tag list of user interests into a large number of binary variables, representing user interests in all the specific categories. We also removed unique features or nearly unique such as Bid ID, Log Type, iPinYou ID, URL, Anonymous URL ID and Key Page URL that we could not train our predictors on.
Experimental Setup
Success in our empirical work will be measured with respect to our valuation of the advertisements. In practice, advertisers value success based on their click-through-rate (CTR) and conversion rate. Each advertiser values the balance between clicks and conversions differently, which is captured in the general literature as the Key Performance Indicator KPI, defined as a linear combination:
where the factor α is advertiser specific. However as seen in Table 3 , the small number of conversions presented an issue and we made the decision to set α = 0 for our testing. The classical approach in RTB literature has been to evaluate the predicted click-through rate pCTR, and conversion rate pCV offline on a training dataset, and to bid an amount in online testing that is a function of these estimates, with the campaign objective of creating bid amounts in order to maximize KPI over won auctions subject to total budget B (special case of (K-2)):
In contrast, to evaluate the threshold strategy, our plan is to create a pCT R estimator for the training dataset, and to set the value of each ad v i equal to the pCT R estimate for our ad. We will in turn find the optimal threshold λ * value for some offline data, and then evaluate the effectiveness of bidding min{ vi λ * , B } for our testing data, where v i is the known value of the ad (as predicted by our estimator), and B is our remaining budget. To evaluate effectiveness we will compare i∈I v i for this selection of ads I , compared to an optimal selection of ads.
To calculate the pCT R for each ad, from the training data we split most categorical features into multiple columns of {0,1}, such as the long-term interests and the demographic fields. A single advert instance is represented by vector of over 50 features. For pCT R prediction we then relied on logistic regressions from R's GLM package. While this gave us a good estimator and was sufficient for our purposes, in practice the eKP I prediction is an essential piece of any bidding strategy and advertisers would be well-served by devoting considerable resources to creating the best prediction model possible. Our priority is evaluating the effectiveness of our policy given an assumed set of values v i for ads chosen reasonably.
We split our data-set into training and testing, randomizing a 70% training and 30% testing split on season three. This allows us to evaluate the threshold strategy in a situation where arrival rates and bidding strategies by our competitors are stable. We hope that in this setting we can recover a selection of bids close to the optimal bundle.
A common difficulty in the experimental setup for RTB research comes from the fact that we only possess the click-through and conversion information given the advertiser that won the auction. Thus in our testing phase, we cannot let an advertiser buy an advert they did not win. We approached this the same manner as previous researchers, and we design a bidding system where each advertiser is only shown auctions they won from the data, but we allow each advertiser a budget only a fraction of the amount they actually spent. Otherwise, with full budget, the optimal strategy would always be to win every ad they previously won at the same price, which is made possible through bidding your remaining budget at every step because of the second-price auction mechanism. We chose to evaluate several fractional budget amounts, and we set the budget for each advertiser as Let us specifically review the testing process for a fixed advertiser under a budget limit. At each time step:
1. We draw an ad randomly from our test set (that the current advertiser won from our data) and we pass it as a bid request.
2. The bidding strategy computes a bid amount for this contextual request, which does not exceed our remaining budget.
3. If the bid is higher than the paying price, then the advertiser wins the auction. If the advertiser wins then the paying price is subtracted from the remaining budget and we add the impression's log and value v i = eKP I to the outcome total.
Results
In this section we present the main results of testing for the third season of iPinYou data. We randomly split the third season into training and test subsets, with 70% of the data used as training data. We then trained our eKP I predictor using a logistic regression on the training data. Summaries of the training and test data, including the total eKP I predictions are given in Table 4 . The next step was benchmarking the optimal bundle that could be achieved for a given budget in the test dataset, in the offline setting. We created benchmarks for each of the five advertisers, and each choice of budget ( ). Then as a benchmark of the the test data, for each budget fraction we calculated λ * and the value of the optimal bundle of ads that could be selected. The benchmarks are summarized in Table 5 .
After benchmarking we tested the online version of our algorithm. To do this we determined the optimal thresholdλ for each budget choice on the training data. We then took the test data, sorted randomly, and applied the dual threshold bidding with that same constantλ in the online setting. We repeated this 100 times with different random orderings of the test data, and recorded the total value v i = eKP I and actual clicks for the associated bundles. The test results are summarized in Table 6 . As expected the dual threshold bidding strategy works extremely well in situations where the arrival rates are relatively constant and bidding strategies of our competitors are stable. In these situations we can directly use a dual-threshold bidding strategy determined from historical data and in our online setting we can recover a bundle of ads with eKP I very close to that of that near-optimal bundle. In these situations ourλ also tends to be very close to that of the optimal λ * as shown in Table 7 .
Conclusions
In this paper we studied strategies for real-time bidding on Internet advertising exchanges, under the second-price auction format. Assuming the values of ads are known, we showed the nearoptimality of a bidding strategy that purchases all ads where the paying price b i are lower than the vi λ * for some constant λ * . We then showed that because of the second-price auction format, this selection of ads is recoverable by bidding exactly vi λ * . This shows optimality of a linear form of bidding under very few assumptions. We then showed that under a stable setting the random sampling assumption could be applied, and again relying on the mechanics of the second-price auction we could apply results for the online knapsack problem. Specifically we showed how with an online one-shot learning algorithm, we could use a linear form of bidding to recover a bundle of ads with competitive ratio 1 − 6 , where could be small given the context.
Evaluating the strategy on the iPinYou dataset, we showed that training and testing on a random split of the same time period reproduces something close to the optimal bundle of ads as expected, giving support to the findings. In the iPinYou dataset we also saw that the effective cost-per-click for an advertiser varied significantly when aggregated by different values of a feature for a given advertiser, implying that there is a tremendous opportunity for academic research to make an impact on capital allocation for a multi-billion dollar area. 
